Abstract: In this paper, we aim to explore whether the supply chain could coordinate under the condition of random fluctuation of both market price and wholesale price. First, we construct a new call option elastic contract model based on the combination of the call option contract and quantity elastic contract, and a call option elastic contract model for emergency supply chain is constructed respectively in view of the information asymmetry caused by suppliers’ hiding supply cost information and manufacturers’ hiding manufacturing cost information in order to look for optimal pricing and ordering decisions, and analyze the influence of asymmetric information on the optimal decision and performance of supply chain and supply chain members by comparing to the complete information case. And the results show that participants in the supply chain with unilateral information advantage can make profits by hiding private cost information when the call option elastic contract coordinates the supply chain based on rising future prices of commodities caused by emergencies, but it will bring damage to the other side of the supply chain as well as the whole supply chain. Meanwhile, we also get the conclusion that the new contract formed by the combination of call option contract and quantity elastic contract is better than the quantity elasticity contract in coordinating the supply chain. Finally, we verify these conclusions by examples.

Key words: stochastic market price, asymmetric information, call option elastic contract